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Antidumping measures affecting developing countries are coII-
centrated in industries with shiftingcomparative advantage-in
sectors with strong, politically influential interest groups. So in
following an export-oriented trade strategy, developing coun-
tries should probably concentrate on sectors that have weak
political influence in developed countries.
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In the European  Community (EC), as in the  The results also suggest certain strategic
United States, "injury" is what antidumping is all  considerations for the trade policy of developing
about.  Antidumping laws are a flexible tool for  countries. Eymann and Schuknecht argue that
prevecting imports from displacing domestic  antidumping measures affecting developing
production in politically influential industries.  countries are concentrated in industries with
shifting comparative advantage, such as steel
The vehicle tor achieving that goal in the  products, basic chemicals, and synthetic fibers.
EC, however, is not protectionist rules, as in the  (Among thc newly industrialized countries, high-
United States, but protectionist discretion.  tcch firmsn  are a frequent target of dumping
investigations.) And such protection is more
The empirical results of Eymann's and  likely in sectors with strong, politically influen-
Schuknecht's study have implications for EC  tial interest groups.
trade policy after 1992. If protectionist interests
demand compensation for the abolition of  If that is indeed the case, it is not sufficient
national protectionist barriers after 1992, EC  that developing countries simply follow an
antidumping measures offer them considerable  export-oriented trade strategy.  They also need to
scope lor achieving their goals since mcasures  concentrate or. sectors that have weak political
arc largely determined by political discretion.  influence in developed countries.
Antidumping measures could therefore become a
pinnacle of "Fortress Europe."
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AngelLka  Eymann  and  Ludger  Schuknecht
Ant ldumplng  laws are  the  primary  Lnstrument  of  protectLonLsm  ln the
European  ComunLty  (BC). 1 Durlng  the  1980s,  the  EC  ruled  on  some  903  dumplng
claims 2 The  average  ad  valorem  equLvalent  of  antldumping  measures  between
1980  and  1985  was  23  percent,  with  peaks  an  hlgh  as  50  percent  or  morel  the
average  tariff  on  manufactured  goods  was  7  percent  (Mosserlin  1989).  Imports
of  products  subject  to  antLdumpLng  investigations  have  fallen  on  average  to
half  thelr  Lnitial  level  wlthln  fLve  years  of  initiatLon  of  an  investigatLon
(Iesearlin  1989).
Thli  chapter  demonstrates  the  promLnence  of  antidumping  laws  as  an
lnetrument  of  trade  pollcy  in  the  EC. it looks  at  how  that  instrument  li
applled  by  examLnLng  the  incLdence  of  antldumping  measures  by  sector  and
country  and  the  adminLitratLve  procedures  followed  ln antLdumpLng  cases.  Based
on  these  findings  and  on  an  amplrlcal  analyaLs  of  the  determlnants  of
antidumpLng  decisions,  it  argues  that  implementation  of  antidumplng  laws  i
governed  more  by  admLnistratLve  and  polLtLcal  dLicretion  than  by  technleal
determLnatLons.  The  "fairness"  or  "unfairneess  of  foreign  trade  practLco  is
part  of  the  rhetorle  of  EC  trade  pollcy,  but  preventing  "Lnjury"  to
polLtLcally  lnfluentlal  domestic  producers  ie  what  motivates  the  applicatLon
of  antLdumping  measures.
The  EC's  antLdumping  regulations  are  not  based  on  any  economLc  notlon  of
dumpLng  but  on  the  GATT AntidumpLng  Code.  The  specificatLons  of  the  GATT code
are  relatLvely  broad.  They  define  Odumping"  as  sales  below  the  "full"  unit
cost  of  productlon  plus  a  "reasonable"  profit  margln.  The  notions  of  "full"
and  "reasonable"  are  not  well  specifLed,  leavLng  consLderable  scope  for
discretionary  LnterpretatLons  of  whether  dumping  has  occurred  ln a  partlcular
Lnotance.  Thus  the  LnstLtutLonal  atructures  governlng  the  determLnatlon  of
dumping  wlthln  a  natlon's  trade  laws  are  of  prLme  Lmportance.
The  GATT code  allows  countrLes  to  operate  wlthln  the  specificatLons  ln
two  dLfferent  ways.  The  United  States  has  taken  one  path,  the  EC  another,  but2
both  paths  ultimately  lead  to an outcome  that  equates  Lnjury  with unfaLrness
and fairness  with  import  restrLetions.  The  Unlted  States  has  added  precliu
specification.  to the  GATT  goneralLtLes,  leaving  lLttle  dLecretion  to the
agencLes  that  evaluate  dumping  petitLons  (Finger,  Hall,  and  Nelson  1982).  The
U.S. Congress,  however,  has  deolgned  the rules  ln  a protectionLit  manner  to
cover  all instances  of  injury.  The  EC has  taken  the  alternative  approach  of
translating  the  GATT code  lnto  general  operatlonal  language,  without  addlng
extensLve  detail.  The administering  agency,  the  SC CommLssoLn,  ls entrusted
with Lnterpreting  that language  to preserve  an undefined  sense  of fairness.
Polltical  influence  i  secured  through  the  adminietratora'  accountabillity  te
the  EC Council  and  to the  member  governments.  In other  words,  both  the  United
States  and  the  EC use  antidumping  measures  to prevent  "injury"  from imports  to
domestic  producerss  the  United  States  formulates  protectionist  rules  while  the
EC applies  protectLonist  discretion.
Who are  the  targets  of EC auntidumping  masures?
Incidence  by  country  groups
Antidumping is the EC's  frontline defense against imports,  but not all
countries  have  been  equally  deterred  by antLdumping  measures.  Japan,  Eastern
European  countries, 3 and  a few  developlng  countrles  includlng  Chlna,  Korea,
Mexico,  Taiwan,  Turkey,  and  Yugoslavia  have  been the  object  of a
disproportionate  share  of such  measures.
Forty-nlne  countrLes  were involved  in  the  903  dumping  investigations
conducted  durlng  1980-90  (table  13.1).  Almost  half of these  cases (445)
involved  Lndustrial  countries,  particularly  the  United  States  and  Japan,  which
accounted  for  two-thLrds  of the  445  cases.  The remaining  cases  were  divided
almost  equally  between  Eastern  European  countries  (220)  and  developLng
countries  (238).  Of the  cases  agaLnst  developlng  countries,  30 percent
lnvolved  the newly  industrialized  countriea  of AsLa (71  cases,  or 8 percent  of
total  cases),  mostly  Talwan  and  South  Korea.3
A dumping investigation has three possible outcomess rejection of the
claim, the levying of an antidumping duty, or negotiation of a  voluntary price
increase (price undertakings) with the parties accused of dumping. Of the  two
restrictive outcomes --  duties and price undertakings --  price undertakings
are the more favorable to the accused party since they allow the foreign
exporter to collect the protectionist rents  --  the  price  Lncrease.  About  one-
quarter of the 903 cases were rejected, 35 percent resulted in imposition of
an  antidumping  duty,  and  40  percent were resolved through price undertakings.
As a group, industrial countries' share of affirmative and negative
decLsions  was  close  to  the  average  for  the  903  cases (table  13.2).  Eastern
European countries had a larger than average share of cases resolved through
price undertakings  (56  percent), a more favorable outcome than antidumping
duties. Developing countries had a higher than average share of cases in which
antidumping duties were levied (43  percent)  but  also a  slightly higher than
average share of rejected claims (27 percent; 30 percent for the newly
industrialized countries). These figures can be interpreted to suggest that
imports from larger countries --  industrial countries and Eastern European
countries --  cause more injury and therefore that cases against th-am  resulted
in a larger share of affirmative decisions. The results also suggest that
developing countries have less leverage for negotiating profitable price
increases  than  do larger countries.
Another way  to assess the relative impact of antidumping measures is to
compare  a  country's or group's share of antidumping cases with its share of
merchandise imports by the EC (table 13.3).4  While 49 percent of cases have
been initiated against industrial countries, thay account for 60 percent of EC
imports. The ratio of antidumping cases to import share varies widely for
individual countries, however. Australia and Switzerland each accounted for
only 0.1 percent  of  antidumping cases while their imports constituted 1
percent and 6 percent, respectively, of total imports. By contrast, Japan,
which accounted for 7 percent of EC imports, was the object of 19 percent of
the antidumping cases.4
An a  group, the Eastern European bloc war the most adversely affected by
antldumplng measures  relative to import share. That group accounted for 10
percent of EC imports but 24 percent of Lts anziLdumping  cases. Of Lndividual
countries, RcmanLa, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany had the highest share of
antidumping cases relatLve to  import  share; Czechoslovakia and East Germany
also had  hlgh  percentages of  cases wlth restrictlve outcomes.
Developing countries fared relatlvely well as a groups 27 percent of
antidumping cases compared to 30 percent of lmports. Some indlvldual
countries, however, were subject to a disproportLonate share of antLdumping
measures. Chlna, Mexico, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and, among the newly
industrialized countries, Korea and TaLwan accounted for 70 percent of the
antidumplng measures dlrected agalnst developing countries but for only 20
percent of that group's share of EC imports.
Incidence  by  4actor
The lncidence of antldumplng cases by LndustrLal sector presents a
dLstLnct pattern of sectoral concentratLon (table 13.4). Almost 60 perce:t of
the cases against industrLal countrLes Lnvolved chemLcal products, machinery,
and offLce and computing equLpment.
Cases a7aLnst developing countrLes (except the newly industrialized
countries) are concentrated ln sectors ofter.  considered to have shLftLng
comparative advantage: 57 percent of the cases involved steel products, basec
chemicals, and synthetic fLbers. AntLdumping measures agaLnst steel imports
protect the EC steel cartel, whlle measures against synthetic fiber  imports
complement the protectLon agaLnst textile and clothing imports negotLated in
the MultLfiber Arrangement. Thle pattern suggests that EC protectionism
through antidumping measures is preventing developing countries from profiting
from their comparative advantage.
Among the newly industrlalized countries, high-tech firms are a frequent
target  of  dumpLng lnvestigations. More than one-third of the cases involved5
consumer  electronLis  products,  a sector  with shlftlng  comparative  advantage
and sophLsticated  technology  requLrements.
The  sectoral  pattern  of  antLdumpLng  measures  suggests  that such  measures
are  beLng  appliel  to  prevent  any  los  of domestic  productlon  to emrgLng
stronger  competitors  among  both  developed  and  developing  countrLie.
Antidumping  procedures  ia  the  United  States  and  the  European  Commuity
The  suggestion  of  a  polltically  motlvated  pattern  of  protectLon  that
emergeo  from  the  analysis  of  the sectoral  and  country  lneldence  of antldumpLng
measures  is  reinforced  by an examlnation  of the  way in  whLch  antidumpLng
decisLons  are  reached  in  the  EC.  A  comparison  of  EC procedures  wlth  those  ln
the  United  States  is  lnformative.  The  contrasts  between  the  two  rystems  throw
lnto  strong  relief  the  one  important  characterLitic  they  shares  both  achieve
protectionist  ends,  despite  their  very  dlfferent  means.
The  United  States
In  the  Unlted  States,  natlonal  rules  specLfy  the  GATT code  in  a way  that
leaves  only  limited  scope  for  bureaucratic  discretion  and  polltlcal
intervention  lnto  any  one  case. 5 ProtectionLst  Lnterests  are  accommodated  by
the  protectLonist  nature  of  the  rules  (Finger  and  Murray  1990).
U.S.  trade  laws  cover  four  distinct  phases  in  the  antldumplng  proceses
application,  investigation,  decilion,  and  appeal.  Applications  that fulfill
certaLn  requirements  wlth respect  to form  and  content  automatlcally  lead  to
investigatlons.  The  procedural  rules  governLng  the  tlme frame  and  rlghts  of
parties  involved  in  an investigation  are  clearly  defined.  The  condltlons
specified  for  the imposition  of preliminary  dutles,  enforcement,  and
prevention  of circumvention  are  unambiguous.  U.S. admlnlstrators  have little
discretion  in  dumplng  cases:  their  determination  in any  case  must conform  wlth
detailed  legislation  and  extensive  admLniLtratLve  regulatLons  (table  13.5).6
For antidumping  measures  to be  applied,  both  dumping  and  injury  have  to
be proven  during  an invœstigation.  The  two  are investigated  separately,
dumping  by the International  Trade  Administration  and injury  by the
International  Trade  Commission.  The rules  governing  the  determination  of
dumping  are relatively  stringent.  Dumping  existo  when  the "normal  value"  of a
product  is  higher  than its  export  price;  "normal  value"  it defined  as the
price  of  the  product  in the  exporter's  home  market,  the  price  in a  third
market,  or full  production  costs  plus a  profit  margin. 6 The  difference
between normal value and export price --  the dumping margin --  determines the
size  of the  antidumping  duty or negotiated  price  increase.  The  criteria  for  a
finding  of injury  are less  detailed  and involve  such  issues  as  market  share
and  capacity  utilization.
If both  dumping  and  injury  are  found,  an antidumping  duty equal  to the
dumping  margin  must be imposed.  The  accused  exporter  can,  however,  avoid  the
duty  by agreeing  to raise  the price  by the  amount  of the dumping  margin.
Frequeatly,  the  parties  negotiate  voluntary  export  restraints  as an
alternative  to price  undertakings.
Two  other  factors  further  decrease  bureaucratic  discretion  and increase
the likelihood  that investigations  will be conducted  impartially.  First,  the
protective  order  system  allows  the  parties  involved  to inspect  each other's
files,  thereby  preventing  collusion  between  administrators  and  either  of the
parties.  Exporters  accused  of dumping  can  review  the  material  on which  the
injury  claim  is  based. 7 Second,  the  Court  of International  Trade  can remand  a
case  to the  administering  agency  if  the  court  finds  that  the  agency  decided
the case "arbitrarily,  capriciously,  or in  abuse  of its  discretion."
The scope  for  political  intervention  into  an individual  investigation  is
also  small.  Neither  Congress  nor  the  president  can  intervene  directly  in  an
investigation.  over  the long  term,  however,  political  influence  can  be exerted
on the  process  through  executive  nominations  for  the  head of the International
Trade  Administration  and  members  of the International  Trade  Commission  and
through  logislative  changes  in  the antidumping  law.7
The  European  Community
The EC antidumping process differs signifLeantly from that of the United
States. EC regulationa translate the GATT Code lnto operational language but
they do not add specificity beyond the code. In deciding a case, the
administering agency, the European Commission, interprets the regulations an
it deems relevant to the case. Accountability to the member governmento
through  the  Council (the forum of member governments that operates as the EC
legislature) ensures that political interests will be taken into account in
the  application of administrative discretion. 8 (The high degree of
administrative d'scretion in the EC system compared to the U.S. system is
illustrated in table 13.5.)
The EC process has five phasess application, preselectLon,
investigation, decision, and appeal. Applications by interested groups are
forwarded to the Commission, which, in t).te  preoelection process, has the
discretion.  to reject an application or initiate an investigation. The
Commission  first  determines  which  applications  fulfill  the formal  criteria  and
then consults the Council's advisory committee about which of these
applications should lead to an investigation. 9
The investigation is conducted by the Commission. Procedural rules allow
some discretion  with  respect  to  time  frame,  imposition  of  temporary duties,
and  prevention  of circumvention. The rights of the parties involved are well
defined. The rules for the determination of dumping are similar in concept but
not in detail to those of the United States. Formal criteria for evaluating
injury were added to the law only in 1984. They include such factors as
changes in  market share, capacity utilization, employment, and profits. These
criteria give the Commission significant discretion ln the determination of
injury.
Two important factors that reduce administrative discretion during an
investigation under the U.S. system are absent from the EC system. The
investigation is less transparent and verifiable than in the United States,because  of the lank  of  a  protective  order  systeM  giving  all  jArties  to the
dispute  the  right  to view  the  othero'  files.  Aloo,  the  EC oystem  'rrovidee  only
limited  scope  for  judLcial  appeal.  The European  Court  of Juot"ce  cannot  remand
a  case  to the  Commission  on the  basin  of an abuse  of bureaucratic  dLecretion.
After  a  finding  of dumping  and injury,  the Commiasion  should  also
consider  issues  of broader  public  interest  --  whether  users  and  consumers  of
the  product  under  investigation  would  be  harmed  by  antidumping  measures  --
before making a final decision. The Commission ie not, however, bound by any
specific  rules  in its  evaluation  of such  isaues.  In none  of the  903 cases
considered  during  the 1980a  did  the  Comision rule  against  the imposition  of
ant'-dumping  measures  on the  basis  of injury  to users  and  consumers.
The  Commission  has  considerable  discretion  in deciding  how  and  by how
much  the  price  of  the  affected  product  is  to be increased  --  whether  by price
undertaking  or antidumping  duty.  Duties  and  undertakings  can  be set  at  any
value  up to that  of the established  dumping  marginy  they  need not  equal  the
full  dumping  margin.
Accountability  is  imposed  through  direct  political  scrutiny.  Politicians
can  interfere  through  the  Council  at the  two  decisive  stag6a  of an antidumping
procedure.  They  can  block  or promote  the  initiation  of an investlgation  in  the
preselection  phase  and  they can  pressure  the  Commission  to apply  its
discretionary  powers  in  the investigation  in accord  with political  objectives.
The  Council  can reject  the  Commission's  findinge  with  a  qualified  majority
vote (fifty-four  of seventy-six  votes).
The  Council  also  exerts  political  influence  over  the antidumping  process
in two  other,  less  direct  ways. It  nominates  the heads  of the Commission,
determines  their  salaries,  controls  their  reappointments,  and  influences  their
future  careers  in national  politics.  And it  can request  changes  in the
regulations  implementing  tne  GATT code.  An example  is the introduction  in 1984
of formal  rules  for  determining  injury.  This legislative  means  of bringing
antidumping decisions in  line with political interests  is far less developed
than in  the  United  States,  however.9
Thu  the  administrative  framework  of  the  EC antidumping  process
indicatem  that  protection  la its  goal  and  suggests  that  the  key  to  achLeving
that  goal in administrative  and  political  discretion  rather  than protectionLit
rules,  as in the  U.S.  system.  In  the followling  eectLon,  we present  the results
of an empLrical  analysii  of the  determLnants  of antLdumping  decisions  to test
that  hypothesis.
An empirical  investigation  of  the  EC autidusping  process
Finger,  Hall,  and  Nelson (1982),  in an  empirical  inventigatLon  of
antidumping  caes  in the United  States,  concladed  that  the decision  to accept
or reject  a claim  is based  on the  technical  application  of antidumping  rules.
We conducted  an analogous  test  to determine  whs-;her  political  discretion  or
the  application  of technical/economic  criteria  better  explains  that same
chcice  for  EC antidumping  cases.  From  our  analyosi  of  EC admlnistrative
procedures  and  the sectoral  and  country  incLdence  of antidumping  cases,  we
hypothesized  that  political  factors  determine  the  choice  between  acceptance
and  rejection  of a claim.  Although,  as is  explained  later,  there  are some
rules  (details,  specifications)  that  also influence  decisions,  conoiderable
latitude  remains  with administrators  to follow  unstated  objectLves  and
unstated  criteria.  We find  that  domestic  producers  have  a better  chance  of
obtaining  relief  from  import  competition  through  antidumping  measures  the
stronger  their  case for  demonstrating  "injury"  and  the  more politicians  depend
on  their  support.
The  abEence  of clearly  specified  rules  governing  other  aspects  of the
antidumping  process  as well  as  the  decision  to accept  or reject  a clalm
suggests  that,  almost  by definition,  political  factors  determine  how
antidumping  measures  will be applied.  The  Commission  has  discretion  to choose
not  only  whether  to accept  or reject  a claim,  but also  whether  to select  an
application  in  the preselection  stage,  to levy  duties  or negotiate  price
undertakings,  and  to impose  duties  or undertakings  that are  lower  than  the10
dumping  margin.  A thorough  investigation  lnto  the motlvee  underlyLng  these
choLe-s  Ls,  however,  lmpeded  by a lack  of published  informatLon. 10
Econometric  wodeJing
For  our analyaLi  of the  factors  underlying  the EC's  deieLions  to accept
or reject  a claim,  we examLned  EC antLdumping  reporte  for informatLon  on the
speeLfic  detaLls  of each  LnvestLgation.ll  We also  gathered  LnformatLon  on
domestLc  and forolgn  producers.  After  selectLng  our explanatory  varLables,  we
investigated  the  dlrection  of thelr  impact  on  the  choice  to  accept  or reject  a
clalm using maximum llkelihood estimatLon  of a binary loglt model. 1 2  The sLgn
of the  estimated  cooffLeLent  for  each  variable  reflects  the  directlon  of this
lmpact  on  the probibillty  that a  claim  will be accepted;  a positive  slgn
indLcates  that  acceptance  becomes  more probable  as the size  of that varLable
(such  as industry  size)  Lncreases.
One-taLled  t-testo  were  used to check  whether  the null  hypothesis  --
that lmpact  is  in the  opposLte  directiLon  --  can  be rejected  at the usual
levels  of significance  (5  percent  and  1 percent).  Additionally,  a goodness  of
fit-Lndex  reflects  the  explanatory  qualLty  of the  eatimated  model
speeLficatLon.  13
Description  of explanatory  variables
Explanatory  variebles  were selected  to reflect  both polLtlcal  and
technical/economic  Lnfluences,  as predetermined  by our  hypotheses.  The
polLtLial  variables  represent  both  natLonal  and  EC pressures  and international
pressures;  the technical  variables  reflect  the two  criteria  that  are supposed
to  govern  Ln  the antidumping process:  Lnjury  and dumplng. (The data appendix
table  provides  details  on  data sources  and  varlable  types  for each  of the
Lndependent  variables.)
Variables measuring political influences. At the international  level,  we
expect  that  a convinclng  threat  of foreign  retallatlon  will reduce  the
likellhood  of an affLrmative  decLsion.  Therefore,  countries  that absorb  a11
large  share  of  EC exports  are  expected  to  be  confronted  with  fewer  trade
barriers.  The  respective  variable  contains  the  EC export  value  for  each
country 1 4 1  its  coofflelent  is  expected  to have  a negative iLgn.  Relative
international  lobbylng  power  le  reflected  ln three  dummy  varLables  for  newly
indt  triAlized  countries,  developing  countrles,  and  Eastern  European
countries.  The  newly  industrlalized  countries  and  developing  countries  are
expected  to have  little  polltical  influence  because  of thelr  predominantly
decentralized  industry  structure. 15 The coefflcients  for  these  dummy
varlables  are  expected  to be  posltive.  Eastern  European  countrles,  with thelr
centralized  trading  systems,  are  expected  to be politlcally  influential,  so
the  coeffLcients  for  their  dummy  variables  are  expected  to be negative.
The impact  of varLius  EC-based  lnterest  groups  Ls reflected  by the  set
of  domestic  political  variables.  Value  added  and  number  of employees  per
sector  are  used as indicators  of lobbylng  power. 16 Industrial  sectors  wlth
high  employment  and hlgh  value  added  are  expected  to be partlcularly  offective
lobbyists  for  affirmatlve  and  hlghly  protectionist  decisions  (see  FLnger,
Hall,  and  Nelson  1982).  Posltive  slgns  of the  coefficients  can  be expected.
Two  varlables  reflect  the  degree  of organization  and  unanimity  among
petltloners  for  an antidumping  measure.  Associations  are  the officlally
recognlzed  and  inclusively  organized  representatives  of EC lndustries;  they
also have  the  necessary  experience  and  contacts  to affect  EC policy.  We expect
decisions  to be more  protectionist  when an application  has  been forwarded  by
an assocLation;  the  coefficient  for  this dummy  varlable  is expected  to be
positlve.  When individual  EC firms  ln  the petitionlng  industry  explicltly
refuse  to cooperate  or object  to an applicatlon,  a conslderable  weakenlng  of
the  petitioners'  case  can  be expected.  When  the antldumping  report  indicates
resistance  from  an  EC competitor,  the respectlve  dummy  variable  takes  a value
of zero;  its  coefficient  is  expected  to be positive.
EC antidumping  reports  also  contain  various  industrial  policy  argumenta,
such  as the  need  to avoid  "dependence  on forelgners"  or the "soclal  or
political  importance"  of the  petitioning  industry.  The  corresponding  variable12
indLcates  direct  or  indirect  iPntervention  by  an  EC  government  into  the
process.  A  positlve  impact on the probability of an affirmative decision ie
expected when a government intervenes.
Finally, a  dunmy variable is included to clarify the effects of the
instLtutional change initiated by the EC Council in the laot quarter of 1984,
establiehing formal rules for injury determination. We expect that the
implementation of these rules has resulted in a tightening up of the procedure
since 1984 and so in  an  increase  in the number of rejections relative to
acceptances for the years 1985-90. The variable takes the value of one for the
period 80-84; ito coefficient is expected to have a  positive sign.
Variables measuring technical influence. The degree to which technical
factors are applied in the determination of dumping  is examined using the two
variables selected for this purpose by Finger, Hall, and Nelson  (1982) in
their U.S. study. They argue that high average wages in a sector indicate high
human-capital intensity and can serve as a proxy for domestic cost advantage.
The  protectionist  bias  in  the  EC decisionmaking  mechanism  increases  the
probability of affirmative findings in cases of cost disadvantage, especially
when the Commission uses productlon costs to determine normal value. The
expected sign of the coefficient for thic variable is negative.
Product differentiation within a  single antidumping application is
approximated by the number of NI4EXE positions (statistical data categories)
per case. Finger, Hall, and Nelson suggest that the coefficient of the
variable should be negative since the pricing concept for dumping is
relatively precise and can be more readily applied to a closely defined
product than to an aggregate of products.
For  injury  determination,  the  influence  of technical  and  economic
criteria is reflected by variables for industry layoffs, changes in market
share  (for  EC and foreign firms), and decreased profits. These factors are
cited in the list of administrative criteria to be applied by the EC
Commission. As already mentioned, the vague formulation of the rules allows13
for  considerable  discretion,  so lnjury  may be interpreted  in ways that stray
from  the  orilginal  intention  behind  the new  rules.
We include  a dummy  variable  wlth  a  value  of one  when the  antidumping
reports  indLcate  layoffs  by petitioner.  and  predict  a positLve  sign  for  the
coefficient. The  coeffLcLent  of the  varLable  for  changes  ln the  exporter's
market  share  ie  expected  to  be  positive  because  Lncreases  Ln foreign  market
shares  should  lead  to more  affLrmatLve  decisiono.  Increasues  in  the  market
share  of EC producers  should  affect  decisLons  adversely;  the coeffLcLent  is
expected  to be negatlve.  Decreases  ln  pro£fts  are represented  by a dummy
varlable  with a value  of  one;  the  expected  sign  of the  coefficLent  is
poeitive.
Results
The  results  of the  estimation  indicate  the  strong  influence  of several
injury  proxies  and  political  Lnfluence  variables  on the decisLon  to accept  or
reject  a claim  (table  13.6).  one clear  message  is  that injury  counts.  The
injury  proxies  --  layoffs,  decreased  profits,  and loss  of EC market  share  by
EC producers  --  prove  to be the relevant  technlcal  variables  that contribute
to a positive  decisLon  in  an antldumplng  caeo.  The  better  a domestlc  producer
is  capable  of demonstrating  Lnjury,  the  better  the  chances  for  winning  relief
from import  competltion.
The  political  influence  of domestLc  industrLes,  unified  in their  request
for  antidumping  measures,  also  affects  the  chances  of an affirmative  outcome.
Large  industry  size  and  actLve  government  support  --  indLcators  of the
political  importance  of the EC producers  --  improve  the  chances  of winning  a
case.  The  reaults  show  that the  explanatory  value  of the  model  specifLcation
that combines  both  political  and  technical  crLteria  is highest  (estimation  6.3
ln table  13.6).
International  political  resLstance  and  the  technLcal  crLteria  for
determining  dumping  seem  to play a  negligible  or ambLguous  role.  Despite  the
importance  of Lndustry  associatLons  Ln EC lobbying,  the coefficient  of that14
variable was not significant. We suspect a bLased pLcture for cases lnltlated
by asocLatLons  because they may be able to pueh very weak cases through the
proaslectlon Otage.
The fact that foreLgn market penetratLon does not affect antidumpLng
decLsLons as expected Le noteworthy. ThLs result suggests that EC producers
are  more  concerned  wlth  changes  in theLr own market share than wlth relatLve
changes  among  foreLgners'  shares.  Or  it  may  be that  firms  (or  countrLes)  that
can  effectLvely  penetrate  the  EC market  and  Lncrease  their  market  share
rapLdly  are  also  more  effectLve  ln polltlcal  counterlobbyLng.
Another intereating result concerns the change ln rules governing injury
determLnatLon. The estLmatLon shows that the Commission granted less relief
after implementatLon of the formal rules. In other words, the new rules are
less protectionlst than the unwrltten interpretation of Lnjury that was
applied before. Thli contrasts wlth experLence in the Unitod States,  where
changes in the rules have made them Lncreasingly protectionist and facLlitated
affLrmatlve determinatLons  (see chapter 14 and Flnger and Murray 1990).
Conclusion
In the European Communlty, as ln the United States, "injury" is what
antldumplng is all about. Antidumping laws are a flexible tool for preventing
imports  from dieplacLng domestLc productLon in polLtically Lnfluentlal
industrLes. The vehicle for achieving that goal, however, is not protectLonist
rules, as Ln the Unlted States, but protectionist discretion.
The empLrical results have impllcatLons for EC trade policy after 1992.
If protectionist Lnterests demand compensation for the abolition of natlonal
protectionist barriers after 1992,17  EC antidumping measures offer them
considerable scope for achievLng their goals since such measures are to a
large extent determLned by polltical diocretion. Antldumplng measures can
therefore become a pLnnacle of "Fortress Europe."15
The  results  also  suggest  certain  strategic  considorations  for  the  trade
policy  of  developing  countries.  We have  argued  that  antidumping  measures
affecting  developing  countrioE  are  concentrated  in  industrieo  with  ohifting
comparative  advantage  and  that  such  protection  Is  more  likely  in oectore  with
strong,  politically  influential  intereet  groups.  If  that  is indeed  the  case,
then  it is not  sufficient  that  developing  countries  simply  follow  an  export°
oriented  trade  strategy;  they  also  need  to  concentrate  on  sectors  that  have
weak political  influence  in  developed  countries.16
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1.  For  that  reason,  the  BC's antidumping  policy  has drawn  the attention  of
trade  policy  analysts.  Tharakan  (1988)  and  Messerlin  (1987,  1989)  have studied
the incidence  of antidumping  applications  and  its  protectionist  impact  by
sectors  and  countriee.  A seminal  study  of  U.S. import  policy  was conducted  by
Baldwin  (1985).
2.  This count  of EC caoes by exporting ftim  accused of dumping is larger  than
the number  presented  in  table  1.1  in chapter  1, which  is based  on data
reported to the GATT and counts  eases  by exporting country.  Many  antidumping
cases  name several  firmo  ln an exportLng  country,  so countLng  by firms  rather
than countrLis  results  Ln a larger  number  of cases.
3.  In  thLs analyios,  "Eastern  European  countrLes"  refers  to members  of the
Councll  for  Mutual  EconomLe  AssiLtance.
4.  The ohare  of Lmports  refers  only  to imports  from  countries  affected  by
antidumpLng  measures.  However,  other  Lmports  are  of very mlnor  importance.
S.  Hillman  (1989,  chapt.  11)  and  Finger  (1989)  provide  a short  overview  of
U.S.  antidumping  pollcy.  Vermulet  (1987)  compares  U.S. and  EC practLce  from  a
legal  perspectiveu  Schuknecht  and  Ureprung  (1990)  provlde  a detailed
institutLonal  study  of U.S  and  BC practLce.
6.  Several  studies  have  ldentified  a protectionist  blas in the antidumplng
rules  (Norall  1986,  Palmeter  1989,  Tharakan  1988,  and  Messerlin  1989).  This
bias increases  the  expected  level  of protection;  however,  it does  not decide
on political  or technLcal  determination.
7.  A pending antidumping case has a certaLn harassment effect on exporters,
however,  whatevev  its  ultlmate  resolutLon,  because  of the  uncertainty  Lt
createo  with respect  to the  prLce  and  quantity  of future  lmports  (Bhagwati
1988).
8.  DetaLled  overvLews  of EC antldumplng  law  are  provided  by Bael  and  Bellis
(1985),  Beselor  and  Williamo  (1986),  Vermulat  (1987),  Bierwagen  and
Hailbronner  (1988),  Grollg  and  Bogaert  (1987),  and  Bierwagen  (1989).
9.  Data  on the preselectLon  process  are  not  publlshed,  but  the rate  of
rejectLon  at thLs stage  li generally  consLdered  to be hLgher  than 50 percent.
The  practLce  of secrecy  at thli  stage  suggests  an intention  to hlde  the
preselectLon erLteria.  The closed nature  of the  proselection process does,
however,  avoLd  the harmful  effect  on imports  of an antLdumpLng  threat.17
10.  Several  hypothvese  have  been  advanced  to explain  the choice  between
undertaklngg  and  duties.  HuLlman  (1990)  and  Stegemann  (1990)  suggest  that
undertakLngs  are  devlce  for  facilitating  collusLon  --  to eet  prlce floors  for
hLgh fixed-cost  LndustrLso,  for  example.  Table  13.2  and  the  dLicussLon  ln the
text  provLde  some evLdence that undertakings may be a  compensatory devlce for
appeasing  strong  forelgn  Lnterests  through  rent  transfers.
11.  We suspect,  however,  that  not  only  the  result  of an investigation  but
also  the information  provlded  in the  reports  was  tailored  to the polltlcal
windo.  Scattered  information  on certaln  attributeo  of oame  cases  resulted  ln
many "missing  values"  ln  the LnvestigatLon.
12.  We used  maxlmum  likelihood  estlmatlon  because  our data  were specifLc  to
each  accused  fLrm.  ThLi  eatLmatLon  technlque  determines  the  acceptance
probabilLty for each accused firm rather  than  predLcting the number  of
affLrmatLve  decoisions  per  year (as  would  an ordlnary  least  squagre
regression).
13.  Rho sq.  adj. is  defined  as 1  mLnus (likelihood  of fully  specifLed  model
mLnus  0.5  times  the number  of parameters  estimated)/likelihood  of a  model  with
alternative speclfic constants  as the only "exogenous" variables. Models with
a goodness of fit index  (reflecting  the model's explanatory power) of 20-
40  percent  should be considered to be fairly well specified. (See also
Horowitz  1983  and  Hensher  and  Johnson  1981,  51.)
14.  Information  on exports  was  drawn  from  the  OECD Statiseics  of  Foreign
Trade (monthly  bulletins).  The  variable  is lagged  by one  year to reflect  the
situation  during  the period  covered  by the investigatLon.  Data for  1989  were
not  avaLlable;  1988  values  were used.
15.  For fLrms  in  the newly  industrialized  countries,  the relatively  recent
entry  lnto  the  EC market  and lack  of SC lobbying  experLonce  work in  the same
direction.  Korea  may  be an exception  since  its  economy  io  partly  based  on
large  conglomerates.
16.  Data on value added and number of employees  were  avaLlable only at the
three  digit  industry  classieication  level (ISIC).
17.  See Schuknecht  (forthcoming)  for  an analysis  of national  protectionism  in
the  EC.18
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Table  1 EC antldumping cases, by country  and outcome, 1980-90
(number  of cases)
Antdumping  Price  No. of
Region/county  Rejecdon  dty  undertoadng  cases
Developea countries
Australia  0  0  1  1
Austria  2  0  3  5
Belgium  0  0  1  1
Canada  3  6  4  13
Finland  0  1  10  11
Japan  31  85  59  175
Greece  2  0  0  2
Iceland  0  1  2  3
israel  0  0  3  3
Norway  3  1  10  14
South Africa  2  1  2  5
Spain  15  5  10  30
Sweden  4  3  18  25
Switzerland  0  0  1  1
United  States  42  67  47  156
Eastern Europe
Albania  1  0  0  1
Bulgaria  4  4  S  13
Czechoslovakda  7  7  27  41
German  Democratic  Republic  7  9  19  35
Hungary  5  2  12  19
Poland  7  4  20  31
Romania  Wi  2  24  36
USSR  10  18  16  44
Developing  countries
(excluding  newly industrialized
countries of Asia)
Algeria  0  2  0  2
Argentina  1  1  1  3
Brazil  1  1  9  5  25
China, P.R.  4  9  12  25
Dominican  Republic  1  0  0  1
Egypt  1  0  0  1
Korea, P.R.  I  0  0  1
Kuwait  0  1  0  1
Libya  0  1  0  1
Malaysia  1  0  1  2
Mexico  1  8  8  17
Portugal  2  0  1  3
PuertoRico  0  3  0  321
Table 1 EC antldumping  cases, by countr  and outcome, 1980-90  (cont.)
Anidumping  Price  No. of
Reglon/couwy  Rejection  duty  undertakdng cases
Developing  countries  (cont.)
Saudi  Arabia  0  1  0  1
Surinam  1  1  0  2
Thailand  1  0  0  1
TrinidadandTobago  1  1  0  2
Turkey  7  10  7  24
Venezuela  1  3  2  6
Virgin  Islands  0  2  0  2
Yugoslavia  9  16  18  43
Zimbabwe  1  0  1  2
Newly  industrialized  countries  (NICs)
Hong  Kong  2  7  1  10
Korea,  Republic  of  7  18  1  26
Singapore  2  2  3  7
Taiwan  10  7  11  28
Group totals
Developed  countries  104  170  171  445
Eastern  Europe  51  46  123  220
Developing  countries (inc. NICs)  65  101  72  238
Newly  industrialized  countries  21  34  16  71
All countries  220  317  366  903
Note:  Cases  are defined  as final  decisions  on products  of single  firms  or countries.
Source:  Computed  from data  in the Official  Journal  of the European  Communities
(various  issues).22
Table 2 EC aniddumplg  cases, by country group and outeome,  I98O-9o
(perce,ntage  of cases)
Antdumping  Price  Percentage
Cowwy group  Rejection  duty  undertialdng  of total cases
Developed  countries  23  38  39  49
Eastern  Europe  23  21  56  24
Developing  countries  (inc. NICs)  27  43  30  27
Newly  industrialized  countries  30  48  22  8
All  countries  24  35  41  100
Note:  Cases  are defined  as final  decisions  on pkaducts  of single  firms  or countries.  Percentages  are
percentages  of total cases  for each  group.
Source:  Computed  from  data in the Official  Jounal of the  European  Communifies  (various  issues).23
Table 3 Selected country %r  country group sharm of EC antidumping cases
and EC Imports,  19890
Cases  as a  Percentage  of
Total  percentage of  Percentage  share  cases wih  a
nwmber  cases against  of EC merchandise  restricdve
County or group  of cases  all countries  imports in 198  outcome
All countries  903  100  100  76
Developed  countries  445  49  60  77
Eastern Eu.-pe  220  24  10  77
Developing  countries  (inc. NICs)  238  27  30  73
Newly industrialized  countries  71  8  4  70
Developed  countries
United States  156  17  19  73
Japan  175  19  7  82
Switzerland  1  0.1  6  100
Australia  1  0.1  1  100
Eastern Europe
Romania  36  4  0.7  72
Czechoslovakia  41  4.5  0.6  83
German Democratic  Republic  35  4  0.5  80
Developing  countries
Egypt  1  0.1  1.1  0
Yugoslavia  43  5  1  79
China, P.R.  25  3  1  84
Mexico  17  2  1  94
Turkey  24  3  0.7  71
Thailand  I  0.1  0.7  0
Malaysia  2  0.2  0.6  50
Newly industrialized  countries
Hong Kong  10  1  1.5  89
Taiwan  28  3  1  64
Korea, Rep.  26  3  1  73
Singapore  7  0.8  0.5  71
Note: Cases are defined as final decisior; on products of single firms or countries.
a. Percentages  of EC imports  from all the countries affected  by antidumping  cases. Percentages are
rescaled to add up to 100 percent.
Source: Computed  from data in the Official  Journal of the European Communities  (various issues)  and
OECD  Stadsdcs of Foreign Thade.24
Table 4 Percntage  of EC aniddumping cases by sector and country group
Developing  Newly
Developed  Eastern  couries  industrialzed
Sector  couatres  Europe  (Inc.  MCs)  counies  Total
Chemical  producte  37  42  40  31  39
Steel and steel products  4  4  17  1  7
Machinery  14  7  4  7  9
Office, compudngmachinery  8  0  0  0  4
Electrical  machinery  2  13  2  0  5
(mostly  household  machinery)
Consumer  electronics  5  0  10  35  5
Other sectors  30  34  27  26  31
a. For developing countries, maily  synthetic  fibers.
Source: Computed  from data in the Officil  Journal of the  European Communites (vaious  issues
Table 5 Discretlonary declslomnalkng In the EC and U.S.
antidumping  process
European  United
Stage  Community  States
Preselection  considerable  none
Investigation
Procedure
Time frame  moderate  none
Rights of parties  none  none
Preliminary  duties  moderate  none
Circumventdon  moderate  none
Rejedon/approval
Dumping  moderate  none
Injury  considerable  moderate
Community  interest  considerable
Instrument selection  considerable  considerable
Level of protecdon  moderate  none25
Tabl  6 A  ceq  aIsWteedmtkuLt ebAkistom of bbina  logh mode
(depender variable: acccepiano  - 1, rejection  - 0
PetaM  dad  a  techncal  direction  E&ftamato  Fsimnaton  Esidmatio
bVWAMuhcOAM  of Impact  6.1  6.2  6.3
Constant  ~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~-2.3687  48489  -2.3637
(.2.86)0  (.35)  (-.55)
Intenational
EC expoltto  country  -0.0001
(4086)
Application against  nemly industrahwzd  conuny  +  -1.1653  .0.9209
(-.1.82)*  (41*54)*w
Appicatons agains developing  countr  +  -0.4050  -0.2515
(-1.37)  (.0.71)
Applictions against  Eastern Buropea country  0.0047  40.4623
(0.02)  (-1.35)
Domesti
Value added  +  2.8335  11.7619
(2.9MOO  ~~~~~~~(2.71)00
Number  of employees  +  -.0044  0.0129
Assoiation as petiioner  +  0.0027  -0.3987
(0.01)  (4.85)
No refusal  of cuppota  by EC frms  +  1IA9M  1.8679
(2.25)0  (1.80)
1ndu'stsia  policy argunen  (Sovernment  intervention)  +  1.3892  2.6819
Changeof adminitamtive  rules  +  0.7317  0.692
(end of 1984)  (3.08)**  (1.81)
Technical Infl oesm
Dwnping
Average  wage  5.999  -27.6701
(1.97)  (.1.82)0
Number  of product affected  0.0666
(1.17)
I*UY
Change of EC market  shar  40.0302  -0.0723
OM1.6)*  (-2.72)**
Change  of foreign  market  share  +  400006  -0.0557
Layoffs  in DC  Industry  +  ~~~~~~ ~  ~  ~~~~~(40.03)  (-257)5*w
Layoffs in  EC industry  +  ~~~~~~~0.9856  1.1801
Decrease in EC industry'n  ~~~~~~~~~~~  +  ~(3.OS)OO  (2.94)**
Deermn  in  EC kWWuy'o  pzofits  +  ~~~1.3395  1.2642
(4.88)00  (3.98)00
Adjusted  goodness  of fit Index (p-2adj.)  0.071  0.115  0.277
Number  of observations  50  544  541
Note: Kumbers  in parenthese are t-ratios.
* indicates  rejecton of H 0 o at the 5 percent level  of significane.
00 indicates  rejection  of H 0 at the 1 percent  level of significnce.
wlIndicates  unexpeted sign.26
Data Appendix  Table. Independent  variables  considered  for incdusion  in estimations
Independent  variable  Variable  type  Data source
Politeal variables
International  vaiables
Total EC exports to country  accused  in  Continuous  OECD  Monthy Stadstics of
period t-1  (in 106  ECU)  Foreign Trade
Application  against newly industrialized  Dummy  Offal  Journal of the European
countries  Communities,  Series L
Application  against  developing  countries  Dummy  Official  Journal  of the European
Communities,  Series L
Application  against  Eastern  European  Dummy  Offcal Journal  of the European
country  Communities,  Series  L
Domestic variables
Value  added  by petitioning  EC industry  in  Continuous  UNIDO  database
period  t-1 (ISIC  3-digit  level)  (in 103  ECU)
I04 x number  of employees  in petitioning  Continuous  UNIDO  database
EC industry  in period  (t-l)
Association  as petitioner  Dummy  Official  Journal of the European
Communities,  Series L
No refusal  of support  by EC nrms  Dummy  Offici  Journal  of the European
Conmunities, Series L
Intervention  of EC member governments  Dummy  Official  Journal of the European
(industrial  policy  argument)  Communities,  Series  L
Final decision  before change  of  Dummy  Official  Journal of the European
administrative  rules (end of 1984)  Communities,  Series L27
Data  Appendix  Table. Indepedent variables  considered  for indlusion  In estimadtons  (cont.)
Independet variable  Variable  type  Data source
Teheial  varables
Dumping
Average  wage  (including  salaries)  in  Continuous  UNIDO  database
petitioning  industry  in period  t-l  (in 105  ECU)
Number  of products  affected  (by NIMEE  Continuous  Offical  Journal  of the European
positions)  Communiies,  Series  L
Iiw#y
Absolute  change  of EC market  share  Continuous  Official  Journal  of the European
Communites,  Series  L
Absolute  change  of foreign  market  share  Continuous  Official  Journal  of the European
Communities,  Series L
Layoffs  in petitioning  EC industry  Dummy  Offlcia  Journal  of the European
Communities,  Series  L
Decrease  in ED industry's  profits/increase  in  Dummy  Offictal  Journal  of the European
losses  Communities,  Series  L
Note:  All  ECU  values  have  been  deflated  to 1980  values.  Dummy  variables  take  the value  of one for
the category  described.
Sources  of information  on excbange  rates and  price indices:  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1990)  and
Eurostat  (1989).PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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